10 Reasons The ‘10 Best In Show’ Is Ill-Suited

 | Feb 12, 2019 13:29

Originally published by Cuffelinks

[Updated version with new research on super fund satisfaction ratings from Roy Morgan at the end of the article].

The Productivity Commission (PC) Report to assess the efficiency and competitiveness of the superannuation system has pushed the wealth industry into a spin since its release in January 2019. The full 700-page Report is an impressive piece of work, linked here . Its key conclusion is that structural flaws are harming millions of Australians, and fixing the problems could give new job entrants today an extra $533,000 by the time they retire in 2064.

Here are a selection of the headlines the PC Report has generated, showing both support for and opposition to the recommendations.

Source: Stephen Huppert

This article focusses on the proposal for a shortlist of ‘Best in Show’ funds for new superannuation members. An independent expert panel would select 10 top-performing funds, and the two-thirds of new workers who don’t know what to do with their super would be handed this list to choose from. The names would be updated every four years, and according to the PC: “Our approach is one of employee (rather than employer) choice.”

h3 Superannuation industry reaction/h3

It’s not often that the Financial Services Council (FSC) representing retail funds, and the Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees (AIST) representing industry funds, agree. Change often benefits one over the other. In this case, both want to protect their clients, and choosing only 10 winners undermines most of their members. Chief Executive of the FSC, Sally Loane, said:

“Taking default superannuation out of the industrial relations system and putting choice into the hands of consumers should be the cornerstone of a modern superannuation system. The FSC is very concerned about the potential unintended consequences for the economy of a ‘10 best in show’ model because it could create a monolithic concentration of funds, stifle competition and create huge barriers for innovative new products.”

AIST’s Chief Executive, Eva Scheerlinck, dislikes the denial of default status for the over 90% of funds not in the top ten:

“It will remove many high-quality funds from the default system, which may also disadvantage members in these funds.”

Let’s look at some reasons why the PC’s recommendations are unlikely to work.

h3 1. The focus should be more on the worst funds, not the best /h3

In diverting most attention to how the Best in Show will be selected, the PC creates the wrong emphasis. Although it acknowledges that many funds are poor performers, with low scale, high fees and inadequate compliance, its primary solution is to pick the 10 best and hope members gravitate towards them. However, the list is overwhelmingly for new super members who do not make a choice, and their balances are tiny in the super pie. The vast majority of members will not change, so the proposal will do little for the estimated five million members in poor funds who are victims of the ‘unlucky lottery’.

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For example, on scale, 93 of the 198 APRA‑regulated funds have less than $1 billion in assets. The PC estimates cost savings of at least $1.8 billion a year if the 50 highest‑cost funds merged with 10 of the best. Then it admits switching between funds is modest, and most people do not understand performance, fees and charges and therefore will see no incentive to change.

The PC is aware of the case for ‘lopping off the tail’ of poor funds but dismisses it in favour of Best in Show. On page 539 of the Report, Geoff Warren of ANU is quoted:

“The performance benchmarking analysis is notable for revealing what appears to be a tail of poorly performing funds. It is not clear that the remainder of the industry is delivering anything different from random variation around their benchmarks.”

The main way to help people in poor-performing funds is not to take the hazardous path of picking 10 winners from 198. It will not matter much over time if a member is in the 11th, 15th or 30th fund. They are all likely to be acceptable as the better funds among 198. The main point should be rationalising the sub-par funds.

h3 2. Change will be extremely slow/h3

In fact, change in super fund allocations will be much slower than most commentators are suggesting. The Best in Show list is only a ‘nudge’ (to use the PC’s word). Another recommendation to only have one default fund for life will increase the likelihood that people will not change. Members are not forced to select a new fund, the Best in Show is targetting new employees who do not make a choice, employees can continue to choose from the wide set of MySuper funds or select their own SMSF.

The PC’s own numbers for contributions each year are:

  • New workforce entrants: $1 billion
  • Job turnover or workforce re-entering: $16.5 billion
  • Voluntary switching: $2.2 billion
  • Staying with existing fund: $128 billion

All this fuss is for a few billion in a system with $2,700 billion in balances and $150 billion in new contributions a year. New workforce entrants are the lowest-paid employees, and most higher-paid employees are generally disengaged and will not even notice there is a Top 10 list. How will anyone make them care? Are we having this debate solely over the $1 billion from new workforce entrants each year?

h3 3. This year’s winner is often next year’s loser/h3

Fund performance comes from asset allocation, stock (or manager) selection and fees. Even where two funds make exactly the same proportional allocation to, say, Australian equities, there will be a significant difference in the stocks held, directly or indirectly. Super funds either insource stock selection to an in-house equity team, pick active managers or select index funds. Some funds have a value bias, some growth, some large cap, others small/mid cap.

Consider the Morningstar data for sector performance to 30 November 2018 for Australian equities and property in percent per annum: